What role did skilled-biased technological change play in narrowing the gender wage gap? To answer that question this paper constructs a task-based Roy model in which workers possess a bundle of basic skills and occupations are characterized as a bundle of basic tasks. The model is estimated using the task data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The main empirical finding is that men have more motor skills than women, but the returns to motor skills have dropped significantly, accounting for a major part of the narrowed gender wage gap from 1980 to 2000.
I. Introduction
This paper studies the contribution of the technological change, induced by a broad adoption of computers, to the narrowing gender wage gap between 1980 and 2010, using the task data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Male wage inequality rapidly rose in the 1980s and continued up until now. On the one hand, labor economists consider that the technological change since the early 1980s has raised the return to skills, which contributed to the increased wage inequality. On the other hand, gender wage gap was stable until 1980 and then dramatically decreased afterward. Despite the fact that the rise of male wage inequality and the fall of gender wage inequality occurred at the same time, many papers, including Blau and Kahn (1997) and Card and DiNardo (2002) Supplementary materials are freely available online at: http://uwpress.wisc.edu/journals/journals/ jhr-supplementary.html
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not consider the role that technological change played in narrowing the gender wage gap. They argue that because men were more educated and experienced than women during this period, the rise in returns to skills caused by the technological change should have widened the gender wage gap. They consider that, despite the technological change being unfavorable to women, the gender wage gap narrowed due to an increase in the measured and unmeasured human capital possessed by women, and possibly a reduction in gender discrimination.
However, when one takes a closer look at the workplace, the technological change seems to have reduced women's disadvantages. Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) find that computers replaced routine manual tasks and lowered returns to manual skills relative to nonroutine cognitive skills. Given that manual task intensive jobs are bluecollar jobs and typically male-dominated, the technological change was unfavorable to men, not women. Borghans, ter Weel, and Weinberg (2006) show that technological and organizational changes have increased the importance of people skills in the workplace and that these changes help explain the increase in women's wages relative to men's. Weinberg (2000) provides empirical evidence that a decline in emphasis on physical skills following computerization has increased the demand for female workers. Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) and Bacolod and Blum (2010) also find evidence that the shift in demand from manual tasks to analytical tasks plays an important role in the change of the gender wage gap.
While these previous contributions provide suggestive evidence for the role of tasks in influencing the gender wage gap, the theory behind these task-approach papers remains silent on how workers are sorted across tasks and how wages are determined in equilibrium. These are important questions for understanding how technological change affects individuals' choice of their job tasks, and ultimately, the distribution of wages.
Based on Yamaguchi (2012) , this paper departs from the previous contributions by developing a simple theoretical framework for the task-approach that models the workers' task choice and the wage determination mechanism. In the model, an occupation is viewed as a bundle of cognitive and motor tasks, and thus, characterized in a two-dimensional space of task complexity, using continuous indices of cognitive and motor task complexity constructed from the DOT. Workers have two different types of task-specific skills: cognitive and motor skills.
1 To produce output, workers apply their skills to tasks. This paper improves on Yamaguchi (2012) by providing the conditions for workers sorting across tasks based on their skill endowments. A skilled worker is always more productive than an unskilled worker at any level of task complexity, and the productivity difference between the two workers increases with task complexity because skills are intensely used in complex tasks. In other words, skilled workers have an absolute advantage in all tasks and comparative advantage in complex tasks. Hence, skilled workers are sorted into complex tasks, while unskilled workers are sorted into simple tasks.
To motivate my empirical analysis based on the structural model, I begin with a few facts about the U.S. labor market from 1980 to 2010. Using the data from the DOT and Current Population Survey (CPS), I show that during that period, workers in motortask-intensive jobs, such as craft occupations, experienced a wage loss as large as to 16 percent, while workers in cognitive-task-intensive jobs, such as professionals, enjoyed a positive wage growth up to 19 percent. These wage growth patterns are consistent with the predictions of the nuanced view of technological change by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) . Another relevant fact is that the motor-task intensive jobs are maledominated. For example, craft occupations are the most motor-task-intensive jobs and during the 1980-2010 period male workers constituted about 95 percent of all craft workers. This gender difference in occupational distribution implies that the technological change adversely affected men relative to women. These facts suggest that examining workers' tasks is a promising way to understand the source of the narrowing gender wage gap.
The structural model is estimated by a semiparametric method that is an alternative to the Kalman filter and Maximum Likelihood estimation adopted by Yamaguchi (2012) . The semiparametric estimation avoids the parametric assumptions for the unobserved skills, and implementation is much more tractable than the Kalman filter algorithm. Departing from previous task-approach papers that use OLS, this paper avoids endogeneity biases arising from the selection into the labor force and occupations based on unobserved skills by employing the correlated random effects approach in estimation. The basic idea of this approach is to put restrictions on the conditional distribution of unobserved heterogeneity given the entire labor force and occupational history. The data soundly reject the exogeneity of tasks and labor force participation in favor of the correlated random effects model. The empirical evidence indicates that ignoring selfselection severely biases the decomposition of changes in the gender wage gap.
The estimation results show that, during the period 1980-2010, men had substantially more motor skills than women, and the returns to motor skills decreased dramatically, which accounts for a major part of the narrowing gender wage gap. However, the analysis by decade shows that the fall of the return to motor skills has ceased by 2000, and hence, the technological change is mostly responsible for the narrowed gender wage gap only until 2000. From 2000 to 2010, the gender wage gap continued to decline, but the estimates suggest that this decline is largely explained by the growth of women's cognitive and general skill relative to men, although the parameters are imprecisely estimated for this period.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the related literature. Section III documents the facts of the U.S. labor market from 1980 to 2010 to motivate the economic model and show the driving force behind the main estimation results. Section IV shows the theoretical framework for understanding the mechanisms for worker assignment to tasks and equilibrium wage determination. Section V discusses the estimation strategy. Section VI describes the data. The estimation results are presented and discussed in Section VII. Section VIII concludes. Galor and Weil (1996) argue that gender differences in brains and brawn are important to explain the narrowing gender gap in the labor market. Welch (2000) also develops a brains-and-brawn model of earnings to explain the narrowing gender wage gap, as well as the rising male wage inequality in a single framework. These papers consider that men's skills are relatively more brawn-intensive, while women's skills are more brain-intensive. Consequently, a rise in the price of brains relative to brawn explains simultaneously the rise in male wage inequality and the narrowing gender wage gap. Rendall (2010) constructs a one sector general equilibrium model in which workers possess brains and brawn, and calibrates it to the U.S. economy to examine the sources of the narrowing gender wage gap. Their models are based on the Gorman-Lancaster characteristics model of earnings, and its key feature is that the return to skills is uniform in the economy. However, Heckman and Scheinkman (1987) reject this uniform skill price hypothesis using the U.S. data. Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) and Bacolod and Blum (2010) use task data to explore the sources of changes in the gender wage gap. This paper departs from these previous contributions, most importantly, by measuring task-specific skills using task experiences. In addition, I address endogenous selection into the labor force and tasks (or occupations) by using the correlated random effects model. The results suggest that these features of the model are quantitatively important in understanding the sources of the gender wage gap. Using the U.S. data, Bacolod and Blum (2010) find that only 17 percent of the change in the gender wage gap from 1979 to 1989 is explained by changes in returns to skills. In contrast, my estimates indicate that the declining returns to motor skills account for a much greater part of the narrowing of the gender wage gap.
II. Related Literature
Recently, Beaudry and Lewis (2014) examined if computerization has reduced the gender wage gap at the city level using the census from 1980 and 2000. They find that cities that experienced faster growth in the wage gap between the college vs. high school graduates also saw a bigger drop in the male-female wage gap. This is suggestive that computerization could be a factor that affected both wage gaps simultaneously. The approach of Beaudry and Lewis (2014) is unique in the identification strategy that relies on the cross-city variations, rather than aggregate time-series variation. Because the time-series evidence could easily be spurious, their findings add more credibility to the hypothesis that computerization reduced the gender wage gap. This paper differs from Beaudry and Lewis (2014) in two respects. First, a model of worker assignment to tasks is developed, which is missing from the single sector models in the previous papers. Second, although the identification strategy here relies on the time-series variation, by taking advantage of the panel structure of the PSID, this paper uses a rich set of control variables for skills in order to avoid endogeneity biases.
III. U.S. Labor Market Facts 1980-2010
I show that motor-task intensive occupations suffered a large wage loss, while cognitive-task intensive occupations enjoyed positive wage growth for 1980-2010 in the United States. This difference in the wage growth pattern across occupations has the potential to explain the narrowing gender wage gap considering that the motortask intensive occupations are male-dominated, while the cognitive-task intensive occupations are not. This simple descriptive analysis clarifies the main driving force behind the main estimation results that involve a complex econometric model.
A. Data

Current population survey
I use the CPS for the descriptive analysis because of its representativeness and large sample size, although I will use the PSID to estimate the main econometric model and take advantage of its panel structure. The CPS sample consists of civilian male and female non-self-employed full-time workers in the nonagricultural sector aged 18-65. Full-time work is defined as 1,500 hours of work per year or more. Hourly wages are deflated by the 1983 PCE deflator. I exclude wages less than $1 per hour and more than $250 per hour from the sample. Note that wages and hours reported in the CPS, as well as in the PSID, are previous years' wages. The sample restrictions imposed in this paper are comparable to Blau and Kahn (1997) .
Dictionary of occupational titles
The DOT contains information on 12,099 occupations defined by worker-performed tasks in each individual occupation. The U.S. Department of Labor compiled the data to provide standardized occupational information for an employment service matching job applicants with job openings. The information included in the DOT is based on the onsite observation of jobs as they are performed in diverse business establishments and on the information obtained from professional and trade associations for the jobs that are difficult to observe. On this basis, in the fourth edition of the DOT, analysts rated each occupation with respect to about 50 characteristics including aptitudes, temperaments, and interests necessary for adequate performance.
In line with the previous papers using the DOT data, this paper assumes that tasks are broadly categorized into either cognitive or motor tasks. By examining the textual definitions of the DOT variables, I select a few variables to measure each type of tasks. The DOT variables that measure cognitive task complexity consist of two worker function variables for data and people; three variables from General Educational Development for reasoning, mathematical, and language skills; three aptitude variables for intelligence, verbal, and numerical skills; and two temperament variables for influencing people and dealing with people. Motor task complexity is measured by one worker function variable for things and seven aptitude variables for motor coordination, manual dexterity, finger dexterity, eye-hand-foot coordination, spatial, form perception, and color discrimination. I summarize each set of variables into a single index of cognitive or motor task complexity by a dimension reduction technique.
2 The constructed indices are normalized such that the mean is 0.5 and the standard deviation is 0.1. As a robustness check, I also constructed the indices using a subset of the variables to define tasks more sharply, but that does not change any of the main results of the paper. Details of variable construction are available in the Online Appendix.
nonroutine analytical/interactive tasks in their measures. My motor task index does not include a physical strength measure, which might seem problematic for those who interpret the brains-and-brawn story literally, but the nuanced view of technological change emphasizes that computers replaced routine tasks while some physically demanding tasks cannot be replaced by computers. Indeed, the physical strength measure seems to pick up nonroutine physical tasks. This is suggested by the wage regression results in Bacolod and Blum (2010) , who indicate that returns to physical tasks did not decrease over time, while those to motor tasks did. These two variables are positively correlated, but need to be carefully distinguished in an empirical analysis that studies the relationship between tasks and wages.
The cognitive tasks could be further separated into analytical and interpersonal or communication tasks. In theory, these are distinct tasks and may play different roles in the labor market. Despite the theoretical and empirical interest, separately identifying the effect of analytical tasks and that of interpersonal tasks on wages using the DOT has some practical problems. As reported by Yamaguchi (2012) , the two task indices are highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.73. Because of their strong correlation, it is difficult to estimate their effects separately with reasonable precision using the DOT and PSID. In addition, the DOT variables may not be very good measurements for interpersonal tasks because the tasks of low-paying service occupations record high ratings. Consequently, the estimated marginal effects of interpersonal task indices on wages are often insignificant or even negative (see Yamaguchi 2010) . For these reasons, I consider a more broadly defined cognitive skill that incorporates both analytical and interpersonal skills. Figure 1 plots the levels of cognitive and motor task complexity for each one-digit occupation. Cognitive tasks of professionals and managers are the most complex, followed by sales, clerical, and craft workers. Cognitive task complexity is lowest for service workers, operators, and laborers. The complexity of motor tasks of craft workers is the highest among all occupations, followed by clerical workers, professionals, and operators. Service and sales workers and laborers are involved in simple motor tasks. Managers report the lowest level of motor task complexity.
B. Wage Growth by Occupation and Gender Gaps
The nuanced view of technological change argues that strong complementarity exists between computers and complex cognitive tasks, while substantial substitution exists between computers and complex motor tasks. I can deduce from Figure 1 that occupations in the bottom right regions (craft workers, operators, and laborers) should have been harmed by computerization because they are relatively motor-task intensive occupations. Occupations in the top left region (professionals, managers, and sales) should have benefited from computerization because they are relatively cognitive-task intensive occupations. Occupations near the diagonal (clerical and service) should have been less affected by computerization.
To examine if these predictions are consistent with the data, I calculate the changes in the mean logwages from 1980 to 2010 for each one-digit occupation. 4 To exclude the effects of composition changes within occupation, I estimate the conditional mean 4. The 1950 census occupation classification is used to classify occupations consistently throughout the period. logwage for 1990, 2000, and 2010 using a nonparametric regression spline method by Ma, Racine, and Yang (2015) . I then apply the estimated functions to the CPS 1980 data so that the worker composition within occupation is fixed at the 1980 level. Covariates include age, gender, five education levels (high school dropouts, high school graduates, some college, college graduates, and advanced degree), and one-digit occupations.
As reported in Table 1 , laborers, craft workers, and operators suffered large wage losses of 9-16 percent from 1980 to 2010, and most of their wage decrease occurred during the 1980s. Clerical and service workers had modest wage gains from 1 to 5 percent. Sales workers, managers, and professionals enjoyed larger wage gains of 6-19 percent. Wages of the cognitive task intensive occupations grew largely during the 1990s. Note that wage growth during this period did not monotonically change with the occupations' skill level. For example, craft workers experienced a large wage loss of 11 percent, but their average wage in 1980 is the third highest and immediately follows those of professionals and managers. Clerical and service workers had modest wage gains, and their wages are the first and second lowest in 1980, respectively. These wage growth patterns cannot be explained by a simple model in which workers possess a single dimensional skill and its return increases over time.
The resulting consequences of these wage changes are different between men and women because the occupations that suffered the largest wage losses are maledominated. In 1980, only 11 percent of laborers and 5 percent of craft workers were female. The share of female operators was also a low 29 percent. This indicates that, in contrast to men, the majority of women were in occupations that did not experience a significant wage loss, which resulted in a smaller wage gap between men and women. The descriptive analysis here suggests that changes in returns to cognitive and motor skills are the key to understanding the driving forces behind the narrowing gender wage gap.
Another notable change during this period is that the share of female workers has increased significantly among professional, manager, and sales workers: from 41 to 56 percent in professionals, from 25 to 40 percent in managers, and from 32 to 42 percent in sales workers. Because these are the cognitive-task intensive occupations, this change may reflect an increase in women's cognitive skills.
IV. Theoretical Framework
The descriptive statistics in the last section suggest that the occupational task is the key to understanding the relationship between the technological change and the gender wage gap. Applying the task-based approach, this section develops a model of occupational choice that helps interpret the stylized facts above. The model is based on Yamaguchi (2012) , which is an extension of the Roy model (see Heckman and Sedlacek 1985) to the case in which the occupation is characterized in the task space. The model is stylized and assumes a perfectly competitive labor market to highlight the main idea.
A. Environment
Consider a competitive labor market in a static environment. Workers supply labor inelastically and have a set of skills that consists of cognitive and motor skills. The skill 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011 . The worker composition is fixed at the 1980 level. The variables controlled include age, gender, five education levels (high school dropouts, high school graduates, some college, college graduates, and advanced degree), and one-digit occupations.
vector of worker i is denoted by s i = (s C,i , s M,i ), where s C,i and s M,i are cognitive and motor skills, respectively, and take nonnegative values. An occupation is defined as a bundle of tasks. Let x j = (x C, j , x M, j ) be a vector of the cognitive and motor task complexity indices that characterize the task of occupation j. The indices take nonnegative values and greater values of x C, j (x M, j ) imply that the cognitive (motor) task of occupation j is more complex.
Labor is the only factor of production. When occupation j is filled by a worker, she produces q j (s i ) units of type j goods. The aggregate output produced by all workers in occupation j is denoted by Q j = + i E Ij q j (s i ), where I j is the set of workers whose occupation is j. This is used as an intermediate input in the production of final consumption goods. The price of the output from occupation j is P j , determined by the supply and demand in a perfectly competitive intermediate input market.
B. Wage Structure
Wages are paid according to the value of marginal product of labor
where w ij is the wage for worker i in occupation j. The output of worker i in occupation j is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function,
Her logwage is given by
where P j h lnP j + lna j because the output price P j and the occupation-specific intercept a j in the production function cannot be separately identified in general. Note that the intercept P j and returns to skills (b C, j and b M, j ) vary across occupations. Because occupations are characterized by tasks, these occupation-specific parameters can be replaced by functions of tasks,
which gives the following wage equation:
Cognitive and motor skills (s C and s M ) are referred to as task-specific skills because log of their marginal product of labor varies across occupations depending on the complexity of the task performed. This heterogeneity in returns to skills is an important feature of a Roy model. Depending on the workers' skill endowment, best-paying jobs are different for different workers, which gives rise to self-selection into occupations. This is the key difference from the Gorman-Lancaster characteristics type of model in which returns to skills are uniform across subsectors of the economy. With uniform returns to skills, workers are indifferent between jobs, and no occupational choice problem exists.
Technological change can be captured by the change in the parameters a j and b j in the occupation-specific production function. This implies that changes in the functions for the returns to skills b C ($) and b M ($) reflect technological change. However, changes in the function p($) reflect not only technological change, but also a change in the output price because the technology parameter a j and the output price P j cannot be separately identified. These implications, but also limitations, should be taken into account when interpreting changes of the parameters in the wage equation.
C. Occupational Choice
How does output vary between workers and across tasks? Consider a simple task. It can be properly done regardless of the worker's skill level, although skilled workers may produce more. In contrast, for a complex task, worker's skill matters very much: bad workers will likely fail and good workers succeed. Skills are used more and contribute significantly to productivity when the corresponding tasks are complex. In short, skilled workers have an absolute advantage in all tasks and comparative advantage in complex tasks. Assuming differentiability, I can formulate this idea as
In the model estimation these sign conditions are not imposed, but tested. Figure 2 illustrates how logwage changes with a worker's task-specific skill between simple and complex tasks. In both simple and complex tasks, logwage increases with skills, but the slope of the logwage schedule is steeper for the complex task. Further, note that the intercept of the logwage schedule is lower for the complex task. This figure indicates that when the task is simple, the productivity difference between skilled and unskilled workers is small. In contrast, when the task is complex, output is sensitive to workers' skills, and the productivity difference between skilled and unskilled workers is amplified. Hence, in Figure 2 , all workers with skills less than s* earn more in the simple task than in the complex task, while workers with skills more than s* earn more in the complex task than in the simple task.
Workers maximize their (log)wage by choosing one among J occupations. Note that the choice of occupation is equivalent to the choice of a task they perform. The worker's problem is given by
In Figure 2 , only two occupations exist for illustration purposes, but the argument can be extended to the case with many occupations. As long as the tradeoff between the intercept and the slope exists, the optimal task complexity level increases with the skill. Teulings (1995) and Gibbons et al. (2005) consider similar wage structures that sort workers across different jobs. The contribution of this paper is to apply the sorting mechanism to a multidimensional task-space model of occupations developed by Yamaguchi (2012) .
V. Estimation Strategy
A. Model Specification
Wage equation
The main focus of this paper is to understand how changes in the prices and quantities of task-specific skills affected the gender wage gap, but they are certainly not the only relevant factors for wage determination. In the empirical analysis, I consider two more factors other than the task-specific skills. The first factor is labeled as general skills. These are different from task-specific skills in that their marginal product is constant across tasks. The second factor is labor unionization, which significantly varies between men and women and over time. These two factors are selected for tractability and their potentially high relevance, although my estimates indicate that excluding union coverage does not change the result qualitatively. 5 The potential role of minimum wage is discussed in Section VIIE2. The decline of union coverage rates might have played an important role in accounting for the change in the gender wage gap. Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) find that workers whose jobs are covered by a union contract make at least 15 percent higher wages. A substantial number of male worker were covered by a union contract in 1980, but the rate significantly decreased by 2010. On the other hand, the union coverage rate for women was lower than that for men, but has been stable between 1980 and 2010. Given that many blue collar jobs are motor-task intensive and covered by a union contract, the large wage decline of motor-task intensive jobs in Section IIIB might reflect the decline of union coverage rates, rather than the decline in returns to motor skills.
Let s G,it and u it be the general skill and an indicator for union coverage for individual i in year t, respectively. Denote by x it = (x C,it , x M,it ) a vector of task complexity indices for the tasks undertaken by individual i in year t,
where d ijt is an indicator variable that takes one if individual i 's occupation is j in year t and takes zero otherwise and x jt is the task complexity index for occupation j in year t. The empirical counterpart of the wage equation (Equation 8) is given by
where e it is an idiosyncratic shock. Note that the task-specific and general skills are not observed by a researcher. The subscript t is for time so that the functions p t ($), b C,t ($), b M,t ($) and coefficients b G,t and b u,t are time-varying.
The function p t (x it ) is specified as a quadratic function for tasks
Because the function p t ($) is time-varying, so too are the p parameters. While it is technically feasible to allow for all time-varying parameters to change arbitrarily across years, I cannot estimate them precisely due to the sample size being small. As an accommodation, I allow for the intercept p 0,t to vary arbitrarily across years, but I approximate other time-varying parameters by a quadratic function of time. For example, the parameter p 1,t is given by The coefficient for general skills b G,t is time-varying and approximated by a linear function of time. The approximation by a linear function rather than a quadratic function may seem restrictive, but this restriction cannot be rejected by the data and helps to increase the precision of the estimates so that the gender wage gap decomposition is interpretable. 6 The union wage premium b u,t is time-varying and approximated by a quadratic function of time.
Note that there is no gender difference in the intercept p t ($), returns to skills (b C,t ($), b C,t ($), and b G,t ), and the union wage premium b u,t . This specification is motivated by the theoretical framework, in particular, the assumption that the labor market is competitive. This assumption implies that workers who have identical skills and perform identical tasks are paid equally. As explained in the next subsection, any gender wage gap not accounted for by observed characteristics is attributed to the gender gap in skills, not in the returns to skills.
Skill equation
Workers acquire skills through learning by doing. Those who performed complex tasks for a long time should have developed the relevant skills. In contrast, those who performed a simple task learn very little from their work. In addition, the extent to which workers learn skills from their work decreases with their work experience e it , which is consistent with observed concave age-earnings profiles. The skill growth rate is specified as
where d it is an indicator variable that takes one if individual i participates in the labor market and zero otherwise. I expect thatc k‚1 > 0 andc k‚2 < 0 so that skills increase at a decreasing rate. The growth rates of cognitive and motor skills vary across tasks, which allows for heterogeneous profiles of skill and wage over time. Note that skills do not change if a worker does not participate in the labor market.
Given the skill growth rate (Equation 16), her skill endowment in year t can be written as (18) lns k‚it = c k‚1 e it + c k‚2 + c k‚3 +
where t i 0 is the year when individual i is observed in the data for the first time. Note that the task-specific skill endowment in year t i 0 is given and does not vary with t. Therefore, it can be seen as a time-invariant component of the task-specific skills. Assume that taskspecific skill endowment in year t i 0 is given by
where z i is a vector of time-invariant observed worker characteristics including years of education, a dummy for nonwhite, and a dummy for women, and s k,i is an unobserved component. The task-specific skill endowment in year t is (20) lns k‚it = c k‚1 e it + c k‚2 e
6. The results for the model in which b G,t is approximated by a quadratic function are available on request.
Note that the entire occupational history since the worker's labor market entry is not necessary because task-specific skills acquired from the labor market entry to year t i 0 -1 are absorbed by the unobserved component s k,i .
General skills also grow over time through learning by doing, but the growth rate does not depend on tasks. The general skill of worker i in year t is given by (21) lns G‚it = c G‚1 e it + c G‚2 e 2 it + c G‚3 z i + r G‚i where r G‚i is an unobserved and time-invariant component of general skills.
At least one variable must be dedicated to each type of task-specific skills s k,i (k = C, M), in order to identify the returns to skills b C,t ($) and b M,t ($). Specifically, the sum of cognitive indices is included in the cognitive skill equation, but not in the motor skill equation. Similarly, the sum of motor indices is included in the motor skill equation, but not in the cognitive skill equation.
In addition, skills require normalization because they do not have a natural unit. Taskspecific skills are measured by the dedicated variables, that is, the sum of task complex indices, implying that g k,3 is set to one. General skills are measured by years of education, and hence, the coefficient for years of education is normalized to one. Other normalization is certainly possible without loss of generality, but the proposed normalization seems natural.
Yet, another identifying assumption is that the parameters in the skill equation (Equations 20 and 21) are time-invariant. This implies that the changes in the marginal returns to worker characteristics (for example, the accumulated task index) are attributed to the change in the return to skills, rather than the changes in the skill functions. This assumption also makes task experiences and education comparable across years. If two individuals have the identical occupational and educational background, live in different time periods, and earn differently, I consider the pay difference to be due to different returns to skills, rather than different skill endowment. This view is also taken by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and many other economists.
It is useful to clarify what features of the data allow one to identify how an observed characteristic (for example, education) can be associated with one general and two different task-specific skills. The identification comes from the variations of the wage return to the worker characteristic across different tasks. Suppose that education increases the cognitive skills. Then, the wage gap between high school and college educated workers increases with cognitive task complexity because returns to cognitive skills increase with task complexity. Similarly, if men possess more motor skills than women, the gender wage gap increases with motor task complexity. The component of the wage gap invariant to tasks is associated with general skills.
Correlated random effects
I estimate the wage equation (Equation 13) along with the skill equation (Equations 20 and 21). There are two possible sources of biases in the estimates. First, occupational choice is endogenous. If the unobserved task-specific and general skills are correlated with the task, the estimates are biased. This is plausible because a wage maximizing worker chooses her optimal occupation based on her task-specific skill endowments, as discussed in Section IVC. Second, labor force participation is also endogenous. If the unobserved skills are systematically different between participants and nonparticipants, the estimates suffer a sample selection bias. This is an important issue, particularly for women.
Notice that neither demeaning nor first-differencing eliminates the unobserved taskspecific skills s k,i (k = C, M) because they are interacted with the task index x k,it through b k,t (x k,it ). The quasi-differencing method used by Gibbons et al. (2005) does not work either because there are two, rather than one, unobserved variables that are interacted with the task index.
I take the correlated random effects approach (see Wooldridge 2010) to address the endogeneity biases. The basic idea is to model the conditional expectation given the entire history of the covariates. I assume variables may be missing at random, which is often implicitly assumed in the literature. Let h it = (d it , x it , e it , u it , z i ) be a vector of observed variables for individual i in year t. For notational simplicity, write h i h it f g
for the observations for individual i over time.
Assume that the covariates are exogenous with respect to the idiosyncratic shocks,
where
) is a vector of unobserved skills. This implies that selection may be related to the covariates h i and unobserved skills s i , but not the idiosyncratic shocks. Combined with Equation 13, this assumption can be rewritten as
In the correlated random effects approach, a researcher models the conditional mean of unobserved skills given the history of the covariates, E(s k,i jh i ), for k = C, M, G. This modeling allows for correlation between unobserved skills s k,i for k = C, M, G and covariates h it in year t. A simple approach taken in this paper is to model the expectations as exchangeable 7 functions of h i . Specifically, the conditional expectations are given by
The variable u i is defined similarly to x k‚i . The variable d l is the rate of labor force participation for individual i while present in the data, and x k‚i is the conditional mean of the task indices given labor force participation (x it and u it do not exist if individual i does not participate).
7. Following Altonji and Matzkin (2005) , by "exchangeable," I mean that the conditional mean E(s k,i jh it 0 ,., h iTi ) does not depend on the order in which the h it is entered into the conditional mean function.
Given Assumptions 23, 24, and 25, the conditional mean logwage is specified as
The functions p t ($), b C,t ($), and b C,t ($) are parametrized by Equations 14 and 16. The model parameters are estimated by the nonlinear least squares since nonlinearity arises from the specification in which some of the parameters multiply each other.
B. Self-Selection into Labor Market and Occupation
Notice that Equation 24 implies a correlation between unobserved task-specific skills s k,i and tasks undertaken by the worker x k,it through the variable x k‚i . This specification is consistent with the worker assignment mechanism outlined in Section VIC. Workers who have high time-invariant unobserved cognitive (motor) skills choose complex cognitive (motor) tasks persistently throughout their careers, which is captured by the time-average of the task indices x k‚i . Equations 24 and 25 also imply a correlation between the unobserved skills and union coverage u it through the variable u i . The correlated random effects approach also allows me to avoid the potential sample selection bias from the increasing labor force attachment of women during the 1980-2010 period. Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) find that, during the 1970s, unskilled women participated in the labor market, while skilled women remained at home. In the 1980s and 1990s, returns to skills rose, increasing the opportunity cost of staying at home for skilled women. Consequently, more and more skilled women started participating in the labor market. Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) claim that this compositional change of the female labor force accounts for the change in the observed gender wage gap even if no change in the wage structure exists.
This selection story implies that the means of unobserved skills as well as those of observed worker characteristics vary between participants and nonparticipants and over time. In the correlated random effects model, these varying compositions of unobserved skills are captured by the variables x i ‚ d i ‚ and u i . To be more specific, consider the mean cognitive skills for participating women in year t.
where PW t is a set of participating women in year t. Because the means of x C‚i ‚ d i ‚ and u i for participating women change over time, the mean of unobserved cognitive skills for participating women changes accordingly. The rise in the female labor force attachment implies the rise in the conditional mean of the rate of labor force participation E( d i ji 2 PW t ). If the coefficient g C,6 is positive, the mean unobserved cognitive skill for participating women increases over time.
In a pooled least squares (or uncorrelated random effects regression), tasks, labor force participation, and union coverage are assumed exogenous, which is obviously too strong of an assumption, inconsistent with the theory. Note that a pooled least squares is a special case of the correlated random effects model in which all the coefficients in Equations 24 and 25 are zero. In Section VIIA, these restrictions imposed by a pooled least squares are soundly rejected in favor of the correlated random effects model.
VI. Data: PSID
A. Variable Definitions and Sample Restrictions
The PSID is a nationally representative household panel survey that began in 1968. To study the evolution of tasks, skills, and wages, I draw a sample of household heads and wives. 8 The PSID contains information on hours of work and labor income in the last year, occupation, demographic variables, 9 years of education, 10 and an indicator for whether the job is covered by a union contract or not.
The task data until 1990 are taken from the fourth edition of the DOT, and those from 1991 on are taken from the revised fourth edition of the DOT. Using the two versions of the DOT, I account for possible task changes within occupation. 11 The task indices are constructed as described in Section IIIA2 and merged with the PSID using the census occupation coding schemes. The DOT occupations are mapped on to the 1970 census occupation code, using the 1971 CPS augmented with the fourth edition of the DOT. The PSID also uses the 1970 census occupation code until 2001, 12 but it uses the 2000 census occupation code from 2003 on. For consistent occupation coding throughout the period of analysis, the 1970 and 2000 census occupation codes are converted into the 1950 occupation codes using a crosswalk constructed by IPUMS-CPS (Flood et al. 2015) .
Using the PSID merged with the DOT, I construct the history of labor force participation and occupation. Following Blau and Kahn (1997) , I focus on full-time jobs. An 8. In the PSID, a man is by construction a household head for a married or cohabiting couple. A woman is a household head in a single household. 9. Age, gender, and race are used in this paper. Wife's race is not reported between 1968 and 1984. I assume wife's race is the same as that of her husband during this period. If more than one race is reported, the most often reported answer is used. 10. Education is reported in the PSID in 1968 PSID in , 1975 PSID in , and 1985 for existing heads of households, and every year for the new entrants into the sample only. When education is missing, I use education reported in the survey prior to the year when education is missing. If it is still missing, I use the education reported in the survey after the year when education is missing. 11. After the revised fourth edition, the DOT was succeeded by the O*NET, but the variables in the O*NET are not comparable with those in the DOT. 12. For the years 1968 to 1980, I use the 1970 census occupation code from the PSID retrospective supplemental data files because they are more accurate.
individual is considered to work full-time if she works 1,500 hours in a given year. Experience is reported for 1974, 1975, 1976, 1985 , and years when a household is interviewed for the first time. For other years, experience is imputed using the indicators for full-time work and experience reported in the earlier survey closest to the year when experience is missing. Because the PSID is conducted biannually from 1999 and only hours in the year before the survey are reported, I assume hours of work two years ago are the same as those in the year before the survey. Occupations are reported for multiple jobs since 1999. I identify occupations two years prior to, as well as those in the year before the survey, by examining the starting date of each job.
Once all the relevant variables are made, I construct a subsample for the wage equation estimation in order to make my sample comparable to those in the previous papers, such as Blau and Kahn (1997) , who also use the PSID. I restrict the sample of individuals to be working full-time and between 25 and 65 years old so that most individuals in the sample completed their schooling. Relaxing this age restriction to include younger individuals who are aged 18-24 years does not change the results significantly. The sample excludes self-employed and agricultural workers. Hourly wages are calculated by dividing labor income by hours of work and are deflated by the 1983 PCE Index. Extreme real hourly wage observations below $1 or above $250 are treated as missing.
It is known that the PSID is less nationally representative than the CPS due to attrition. Blau and Kahn (1997) extensively examine the consequences of sample attrition in the PSID by comparing various statistics with the CPS. They find that the reported hourly wages in the PSID tend to be higher than the CPS, but do not find evidence of a significant attrition bias in other statistics. Most importantly, they find that changes in gender wage gap are very similar in the two data sets. I confirm these patterns in my own Notes: The source is the PSID in 1980-2010. Statistics are based on the pooled sample. Wages are deflated by 1983 PCE Index. The sample includes household heads and wives who worked full-time (1,500 hours a year or more). Those who are younger than 25 or older than 65 are excluded from the sample. Self-employed and agricultural workers are also not in the sample. The PSID sample weights are applied.
sample going up to 2010 and argue that the PSID is suitable for the analysis of changes in the gender wage gap.
B. Summary Statistics of the Sample
The means and standard deviations of selected variables for the PSID sample are reported in Table 2 . The sample includes 9,190 individuals and 64,594 pooled observations. All the descriptive statistics seem reasonable. Table 3 reports the gender gap in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 . All statistics are calculated as men's mean minus women's mean. The mean log hourly wage exhibits well-known patterns. Men's wages were higher than women's by 47.5 percent in 1980. The gender wage gap was quickly reduced to 0.362 log-points by 1990, but the pace of narrowing slowed down during the 1990s, and it was 0.327 log-points in 2000. The gender wage gap substantially shrunk again in the 2000s, and it was 0.245 logpoints in 2010.
Human capital is often measured by years of education and labor market experience. Statistics show that men's advantage over women in these dimensions decreased over time. Men were more educated than women by about 0.2-0.3 years until 2000, but the gender gap in education is reversed in 2010 when women were more educated by 0.245 years. Men had more labor market experience than women, but the gender gap significantly decreased from 7.135 years in 1980 to 3.381 years in 2010. These statistics show that women caught up substantially with men during the last three decades.
The union coverage rate was higher for men, and the gender gap was 14.1 percentage points in 1980. The gender gap in the union coverage rate quickly decreased over time and eventually reversed in 2010. The union coverage rate for women was 1 percentage point higher than men in 2010. Given the significant union wage premium, the decrease in the gender gap in the union coverage rate may account for a part of the decrease in the gender wage gap.
Tasks are also different between men and women. For cognitive tasks, men took more complex tasks than women by 0.006 points in 1980, but the gender gap was reversed by 1990. In 2010, women took more complex cognitive tasks than men by 0.020 points. For motor tasks, men took more complex tasks than women throughout the period, and the gender gap increased from 0.016 points in 1980 to 0.024 points in 2010.
VII. Estimation Results
This section presents the main results of the paper. In Section VIIA I show parameter estimates and test the correlated random effects model. Section VIIB examines how returns to skills vary across occupations and change from 1980 to 2010 and tests the worker sorting mechanism based on task-specific skills. Section VIIC presents estimated differences in skill endowments between men and women. In Section VIID, I decompose the changes in the gender wage gap.
A. Parameter Estimates
This section reports estimates for the structural parameters. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
The parameter estimates for the function p t ($) (see Equation 14) are reported in Table 4 . Many of the parameters are estimated with small standard errors. The parameter estimates for marginal returns to skills (Equation 16 ) are reported in Table 5 . The estimates indicate that the marginal returns to skills increase with the task complexity index, although only the coefficient for the cognitive task index is marginally significant with the p-value of 0.081. I will examine how returns to skills vary across tasks and over time in detail in Section VIIB. Table 6 reports the parameter estimates for the union wage premium. Union coverage increased wages by 9.2 percent in 1980.
The parameter estimates for the skill functions (Equations 29 and 30) are reported in Table 7 . Remember that the task-specific skills are measured by the sum of the task indices and the general skill is measured by years of education, and hence, the coefficients for these variables are set to one. Although signs are intuitive, none of the variables in the cognitive skill equation are significant at the 5 percent level. This may be because the dedicated variable (the sum of cognitive task indices) accounts for most of the cognitive skills, and other variables do not have much additional explanatory power. In contrast, many variables in the motor skill function are statistically significant. The third set of parameter estimates is for the general skill function. The signs are intuitive and standard errors are small. I test the correlated random effects model as an alternative hypothesis by taking a pooled nonlinear least square regression as the null hypothesis. The test result is reported in Table 8 . Row 4 shows the test result for the null hypothesis that all the coefficients in Equations 24 and 25 are zero. This is soundly rejected in favor of the correlated random effects model. The significance of the random effects is also examined by skill type. For cognitive skills, I cannot reject that the unobserved skills are uncorrelated with tasks, labor force participation, and union coverage. However, for motor and general skills, I reject this hypothesis, implying that omitting correlated random effects biases the parameter estimates. 
B. Wage Structure
Heterogeneity in returns to skills across tasks is the main driver of worker-task assignment, as discussed in Section IV. The key feature of the assignment mechanism is the tradeoff between the intercept and the slope of the wage schedule in Figure 2 . Figures 3 and 4 show the estimated wage schedules in 1980 and 2010. The horizontal axes show normalized task-specific skills. They are normalized so that mean and standard deviation of the skills are zero and one for all workers in 1980. The vertical axes show the normalized logwage. It is normalized so that the mean is zero for those whose skills and occupations are average; that is, the skill is zero and task is 0.5 in the graphs. Figure 3 displays the wage schedule in 1980, while Figure 4 represents the wage schedule in 2010. The tradeoff between the intercept and the slope can be clearly seen for the cognitive task and skill dimension, but not for the motor task and skill dimension.
The tradeoff between the intercept and slope is tested at the mean task index (x C , x M = 0.5), and the results are reported in Table 9 . Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The intercept significantly decreases with the cognitive task index throughout 1980-2010, but it does with the motor task index only in 1980 . In 1990 , the intercept increases with the motor task index. The slope or the marginal returns to cognitive skills increases with the cognitive task index, which is significant at the 10 percent level. The slope for the motor skills also increases with the motor task index, but it is not statistically significant. Overall, the sorting mechanism seems to exist for the cognitive task and the skill dimension, but no evidence is found for the motor task and the skill dimensions, which confirms the visual inspection of the wage structure illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 . Table 10 presents marginal returns to skills for the 1980-2010 period. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The marginal returns to task-specific skills b k,t ($) are evaluated at the mean task (x C , x M = 0.5) and normalized to one in 1980 to facilitate interpretation. The most striking feature is the dramatic drop in the return to motor skills. It decreased to 0.488 in 1990 and further to 0.232 in 2000, but the decrease stopped during the 2000s. This striking decrease in the return to motor skills is consistent with the wage growth patterns at the occupation level presented in Table 1 . The return to cognitive skill has been largely stable since 1980, and the return to general skill increased to 1.414 in 2010, but they are imprecisely estimated. 
Figure 3 Estimated Wage Schedule in 1980
Note: The horizontal axis shows skills normalized so that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one using the skill distribution in 1980. The vertical axis shows logwage normalized so that the average worker (her skill level is zero) earns zero at the average job (x = 0.5).
Figure 4 Estimated Wage Schedule in 2010
Table 9
Testing the Sorting Mechanism 
Table 10
Changes in Marginal Returns to Skills Table 11 reports estimated skill gaps between men and women along with the bootstrapped standard errors from 1,000 replications in which data are resampled by individual. To facilitate interpretation, the skill gaps for both years are measured in logwage by multiplying the skill gaps and the returns to skills for an average task (x = 0.5) in 1980. I find that men had more motor skills than women, and this difference resulted in 16-18 percent higher wages for men during 1980-2010. In contrast, there is no statistically significant gender gap in cognitive skills during the same period except for 2000. I also find that men had more general skills than women; however, the gender gap decreased during this period. In 1980, the gender gap in general skill resulted in 23.4 percent higher wages for men, but the wage gap resulting from general skills decreased to 10.5 percent in 2010.
C. Skill Endowments
In the previous literature, no gender difference in cognitive skills and a significant gender difference in motor skills are often assumed, but not estimated (see Galor and Weil 1996; Rendall 2010 ). Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) and Bacolod and Blum (2010) measure the gender difference in these skills by the task indices alone. However, they do not find a difference large enough to lead to a significant gender wage gap. This paper takes one step further and estimates the gender gap in skill endowments. I find that the estimates are intuitive, and confirm the assumptions made by Galor and Weil (1996) and Rendall (2010) .
D. Wage Gap Decomposition
The findings so far indicate that men are endowed with more motor skills than women, and that the returns to motor skills decreased over time. This implies that the decrease in the return to motor skills is responsible for the reduced gender wage gap from 1980 to 2010. In this subsection I formally examine this hypothesis by decomposing the changes in the gender wage gap for the period 1980-2010, as well as for each of the three decades.
Changes in the mean wage gap are decomposed into (i) the wage structure effect that reflects changes in the parameter values and (ii) the composition effect that reflects the changes in tasks and skills. 13 To derive the composition effect, I fix the parameters (that is, the wage structure) in a certain year and calculate counterfactual wage gaps. The difference between the predicted wage gap of the estimated model and the composition effect identifies the wage structure effect. The decomposition exercise is carried out as follows. The gender wage gap in year t, G t , is measured by mean logwage difference between men and women and given by
where Q t is a set of parameters in year t, and F t is a distribution function in year t for task, skill, gender, and other worker characteristics. The change in the gender wage gap Table 11 Skill Gaps between Men and Women between t and t + 10 is DG = G(Q t + 10 , F t + 10 ) -G(Q t , F t ), which can be decomposed into two components in two different ways:
Tables 12-13 present the estimates for the gender logwage gap decomposition along with standard errors based on 1,000 bootstrap replications with individual level clustering. The decomposition based on Equation 34 is in Table 12 , while that based on Equation 35 is in Table 13 , although both specifications produce very similar results.
From 1980 to 2010, the gender wage gap decreased by 0.230 log-points. As expected, the fall of the returns to motor skills and tasks accounts for 0.151-0.155 log-points. This result is along the same lines as the empirical analysis in Section IIIB in which maledominated motor-task intensive jobs suffered a large wage loss. Devaluation of motor skills hurts men, but not women, resulting in a narrowing gender wage gap. Another important factor is the growth of women's general skills, which accounts for 0.130-0.175 log-points. Because men had more general skills than women throughout this period, the rise of the return to general skills widened the gender wage gap by 0.037-0.082 log-points. The role of cognitive skill and its return is small and insignificant. Deunionization does not appear to have a significant effect on the gender wage gap. Union premium was 0.092 in 1980 and fairly stable over time (see Table 6 ), while the gender gap in union coverage nearly disappeared during this period (see Table 3 ). However, the dissipation of the gender gap in union coverage is quantitatively unimportant and accounts for 0.005-0.014 log-points.
The pace of the decrease in the gender wage gap is not constant, and the main driver of the decrease varies across periods. To see the difference across periods, I decompose the change in the gender wage gap by decade. From 1980 to 1990, the gender wage gap decreased by 0.113 log-points. Most of the decrease is explained by the fall of the return to motor skills that accounts for 0.104-0.118 log-points. From 1990 to 2000, the gender wage gap decreased only by 0.035 log-points. Because different factors affected the gender wage gap in different directions in this decade, interpretation is not quite straightforward. The result indicates that the fall of the return to motor skills accounts for 0.051-0.058 log-points, and the faster growth of women's general skills than men's 14. Note that this decomposition exercise is independent of normalization of skills and tasks. Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) point out that a detailed decomposition in the Oaxaca-Blinder method is generally not free from the choice of normalization of scalable variables. In particular, the choice of mean (or location parameter) of the scalable variable changes detailed decompositions. It is true that the task and skill measures are scalable variables, but my decomposition outlined above is unaffected by normalization. This is because the differences in tasks and skills between men and women, not the level of tasks and skills, are included in the decomposition equations (Equations 34 and 35). The differences are independent of the choice of mean (or location parameter) of tasks and skills, and hence, the decomposition is free from the choice of normalization.
Table 12
Decomposition of Changes in Gender Logwage Gap ( accounts for 0.097-0.107 log-points. Their effects were offset by the change in cognitive skills, but the effects were imprecisely estimated. From 2000 to 2010, the gender wage gap again substantially decreased by 0.082 log-points. Because the return to motor skills was stable between 2000 and 2010, it had no effect on the gender wage gap, unlike during the previous two decades (see Table 10 ). The decrease in the gender wage gap during this decade is driven by the faster growth of women's cognitive and general skills, compared to men, although they are not precisely estimated.
E. Discussion
Comparison with alternative models
Previous papers find that the wage structure effect is small or leads to a widening gender wage gap. Blau and Kahn (1997) find that changes in the wage structure should have widened the gender wage gap, because they measure skills by education and experience, and the returns to those variables have increased. Bacolod and Blum (2010) include occupational task indices in their wage regression and interpret these task indices as proxies for skills. They find that changes in returns to skills measured by the task indices account for only 0.0208 log-points out of 0.1194 log-points from 1979 to 1989. 15 Their results indicate that the composition effect is the major factor in explaining the narrowing gender wage gap. In contrast, this paper finds a large wage structure effect: the fall of the return to motor skills has narrowed the gender wage gap until 2000.
The key difference from Bacolod and Blum (2010) lies in the skill measurement. In this paper, cognitive and motor skills are measured by the cumulative sum of previous tasks. I also allow for education and experience to contribute to cognitive, motor, and general skills. Moreover, taking advantage of the panel structure of the PSID, I control for the unobserved skills with the correlated random effects approach.
To see how different models lead to different decompositions, I compare different decompositions of the change in the gender wage gap from 1980 to 2010 based on four models, differing by whether task-specific skills and correlated random effects are included or not. Model 1 includes no task-specific skills and no correlated random effects. This is a special case of the baseline model in that all the parameters in Equations 16, 20, 24, and 25 are zero. While not identical, this model is comparable to that by Bacolod and Blum (2010) . Model 2 extends Model 1 by allowing for the unobserved general skills that are correlated with the task indices. Specifically, x C‚i and x M‚i are added to Equation 25, while all the parameters in Equations 16, 20, and 24 are zero. Model 3 includes task-specific skills, but no correlated random effects. This is a special case of the baseline model in that all the parameters in Equations 24 and 25 are zero. Model 4 is the baseline model that includes both task-specific skills and correlated random effects.
The results are reported in Tables 14 and 15 . As expected, Model 1 indicates that changes in returns to skills and tasks account for very little of the decrease in the gender wage gap. The faster growth of women's cognitive and general skills compared to men and de-unionization largely account for the decrease in the gender wage gap. As 15. See Table 11 on page 239 in Bacolod and Blum (2010) . ). Model 1 includes no task-specific skills and no correlated random effects. Model 2 includes correlated random effects, but no task-specific skills. Model 3 includes task-specific skills, but no correlated random effects. Model 4 includes both task-specific skills and correlated random effect. The bootstrapped standard errors are reported. Notes: The wage structure effects are calculated by assuming that worker composition is fixed in the start of the period or t (see Equation 35 ). Model 1 includes no task-specific skills and no correlated random effects. Model 2 includes correlated random effects, but no task-specific skills. Model 3 includes task-specific skills, but no correlated random effects. Model 4 includes both task-specific skills and correlated random effect. The bootstrapped standard errors are reported.
indicated by Model 2, allowing for correlated random effects does not change the unimportance of the wage structure effects, although the growth of women's general skills accounts for a large part of the change in the gender wage gap. Model 3 indicates that changes in return to motor skill increased, rather than decreased, the gender wage gap. Without the correlated random effects, the estimates are not only biased, but also with large standard errors (compared to Model 4). The additional control variables for the correlated random effects ( x C‚i ‚ x M‚i ‚ u i ‚ and d i ) help avoid the selection biases and estimate parameters precisely.
Role of minimum wage
One might consider that the minimum wage also contributed to the narrowed gender wage gap. Although I am unable to incorporate the minimum wage in the theoretical model for tractability, empirical evidence suggests that the minimum wage played only a limited role in accounting for the changes in the gender wage gap during 1980 . DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996 find that the minimum wage has significant effects on the lower tail of the wage distribution. Because the real minimum wage quickly decreased during the 1980s, and many women earned the minimum wage at the time, the gender wage gap may have increased during that time. However, Lee (1999) finds that the minimum wage had little effects on the changes in the mean wage gap between groups including men and women. Given his result and the fact that the real minimum wage was stable in later periods, I argue that the minimum wage does not account for the narrowed gender wage gap significantly.
What changed the returns to skills?
The main finding of this paper is that the changes in returns to skills largely account for the decrease in the gender wage gap. But what changed the returns to skills? This paper argues that the source of the changes in returns to skills is the technological change. However, one might consider that trade with developing countries and/or an inflow of low-skilled immigrants have also affected the skill prices. While these concerns are theoretically relevant, empirical evidence does not support their roles in accounting for the narrowed gender wage gap.
In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade with developing countries raises the demand for skill-intensive goods made in the United States. This change in demand ultimately increases returns to skills in the United States through a price increase of the skillintensive goods, the effect known as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
However, empirical evidence does not support that trade increased the skill price, at least until the early 1990s. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Sachs and Shatz (1994) find that the relative price of skill-intensive goods did not increase during the period of increasing inequality. Another evidence in conflict with the trade theory is that returns to skills in developing countries also increased. This is opposite of the theoretical predictions. Furthermore, evidence in support of the technology view and against the trade view is that the share of skilled workers increased within industries, while the trade theory predicts it would have remained intact. Moreover, Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) find that the skill-biased technological change is pervasive across developed countries. On these grounds, I argue that the technological change increases returns to skills even in an open economy, and international trade does not play a significant role.
Immigration is another potential source that could have lowered the return to motor skills. Immigrants predominantly have low educational background and limited English skills. The large inflow of immigrants may have affected the least skilled native workers. Despite this concern, the empirical evidence indicates that immigration did not have much effect on wage inequality. Card (2009) finds that high school dropouts and high school graduates are nearly perfect substitutes, and hence, the impact of low-skilled immigration is diffused across a wide segment of the labor market.
VIII. Conclusion
Using the task-based approach, this study constructs a Roy model of occupational choice in which workers possess cognitive and motor skills, and occupations are characterized by cognitive and motor tasks. The key feature of the model is the heterogeneity in returns to skills across occupations that gives rise to self-selection into occupations. The model is used as a guide to how a wage equation should be formulated and motivates the skill measurement.
The empirical results indicate that men have significantly more motor skills than women, while only a small difference in cognitive skills between genders exists. The returns to motor skills dropped dramatically from 1980 to 2000, which is consistent with the nuanced view of technological change. Because men had more motor skills than women throughout this period, the fall of the returns to motor skills accounts for a major part of the narrowing gender wage gap in 1980-2000. Although estimates are not precise, the decomposition suggests that the faster growth of women's cognitive and general skills than men accounts for the decrease in the gender wage gap during the 2000s.
Although I developed a framework for studying the relationship between tasks, skills, and wages, I did not estimate a full structural model in which they are all endogenously determined. Changes in returns to skills should have affected the workers' skill investment as well as their occupational choice and labor force participation decisions. Studying these changes in the worker behavior is an important step toward a thorough understanding of how technological change has reshaped the labor market.
